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Can medical scheme reform lead to fairer distribution of 
limited resources? A funding perspective 
Bettina Taylor, Derrick Bums 
While many South Africans were celebrating 10 years of 
democracy, frustrated doctors took to the streets to voice their 
dissatisfaction about the state of health care in our country. 
Both public and private-sector workers joined the protest 
against deteriorating working conditions in public facilities, 
inadequate patient care and various government intervention 
strategies. Private-sector doctors were motivated in particular 
by the impending Medicines Control Amendment Act (forcing 
the special licensing of dispensing doctors) and the proposed 
Certificate of Need (regulating where doctors may practise in 
future). Such legislation is perceived as heavy-handed, 
uninformed and a destructive interference. 
Amid such frustration and confrontation, and mindful of 
arguably inept introduction of some aspects of government 
policy and legislation, we believe it timely to review some of 
the positive aspects of recent developments in health care. We 
refer particularly to changes within the medical scheme 
environment. Medical scheme legislation has resulted in the 
unusual, but opportune, situation of private medical schemes 
and their managed care organisations being governed by 
principles of social health - a concept, we believe, not widely 
acknowledged or understood as yet by a majority of 
stakeholders. Current and proposed legislation has paved the 
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way for solidarity and is encouraging improved funding and 
delivery models of health care, with the ultimate objective of 
fairer distribution of resources and better access to health care. 
Social health insurance (SHI) 
South Africa's progressive constitution is highly protective of 
the individual's socio-economic rights, including the right to 
have access to 'health service; (Chapter 2, section 27, 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). There is an 
obligation on the state's leadership not only to respect and 
protect the right to health care, but also to implement such a 
right. Therefore, to facilitate the progressive realisation of 
quality health care for all, government is committed to a 
system of SHI.' The objectives of such health care funding 
reform would be to reduce inequities in health care financing 
by improving cross-subsidisation of the sick and poor by the 
healthy and wealthy and by increasing revenue through 
mandatory contributions specifically earmarked for spending 
on health care services.' Funding disparities include the 
following. 
1. Private-sector health care spending is more than 5 times 
the per capita expenditure of the public sector. Or, presented 
differently, the private sector spends R35.5 billion to serve only 
17% of the population, whereas the other 83% of the 
population only have R32.2 billion to share.' 
2. Until recently, there was discrimination within the 
private sector against the sick and those with lower incomes. 
IBI 
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Prior to 2000, the private sector was deregulated and was 
largely managed according to standard insurance principles. 
Individual risk-rating techniques and benefit designs 
(paradoxically) favoured, especially in the open-scheme 
environment, young and healthy membership, while 
discouraging older and more ill membership. 
The private sector therefore not only consumes a 
disproportionate amount of health care monies, but despite 
such it has failed to provide adequately for its poorer and 
sicker members. Where members have exhausted limited 
benefits, the private sector has historically abdicated its 
responsibilities, leaving such patients to be cared for by an 
already overburdened state. Further, year-on-year health care 
inflation in the private sector that repeatedly exceeds the 
consumer price index (CPI) is threatening voluntary 
membership as medical ?cheme contributions increasingly 
become less affordable. Such signs ominously predict further 
disparities between the 'have's' and 'have not's' with regard to 
health care access. Therefore, as part of its plan to achieve the 
overall objective of 'better life for all' in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the government is seeking to reform both financing of 
'private' health care and budget allocation by medical schemes. 
To achieve its goals the following legislative changes have been 
proposed and partially implemented. 
Ensuring access to a social health package -
Medical Schemes Act of 1998 
With medical schemes acting as the vehicles through which 
health care within an SHI system will be purchased, legislation 
governing the private funding industry has been introduced 
progressively since the year 2000. Such legislative change is 
aimed at enabling a 'public health' approach to resource 
allocation. Noteworthy aspects mandated by the Medical 
Schemes Act (No. 131 of 1998) and its regulations include the 
following. 
1. Open enrolment, whereby medical schemes cannot deny 
membership on the basis of age or pre-existing illness. 
2. Community-rating as opposed to risk-rating, whereby 
schemes charge community-based membership rates instead of 
fees based on an individual's perceived financial risk to that 
scheme. 
3. Prescribed minimum benefits (PMBs), whereby schemes 
are obliged to cover a minimum set of hospital-based and 
chronic illness benefits without financial limitations in at least 
one provider network and at the minimum level of care 
provided by public-sector facility. The PMBs therefore describe 
the basic health care package (the 'social health package') that 
all scheme members should have access to without financial 
limitations. 
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Financing of SHI - mandatory cover, the risk 
equalisation fund and tax reform 
To improve cross-subsidisation of health care and to increase 
pre-paid revenue earmarked specifically for health care 
services, government is pursuing income-based mandatory 
contribution to an 'SHI' fund (also referred to as the risk-
equalisationfund or REF). Such a fund is aimed at financing a 
basic health care package for all those ~ontributing. With 
medical schemes being the vehicles through which such a fund 
will be allocated, the government is also seeking to define a 
formula whereby such monies are allocated fairly to individual 
schemes to provide the necessary cover.' As schemes currently 
differ in their demographic profile and the associated PMB 
burden, it is important that funds are distributed according to 
schemes' risk profiles. Such an approach of risk equalisation 
across schemes should have the added benefit of forcing 
schemes to compete on efficiencies, rather than benefit designs 
that attract the young and healthy and discriminate against the 
sick and elderly. The ability to purchase cost-effective quality 
health services should become a major differentiating·factor 
between schemes. 
Furthermore, government has appointed a task team to 
investigate fairer distribution of tax-based funds specifically 
earmarked for health care.' Tax subsidies afforded to those 
with comprehensive private medical insurance are in excess of 
the per capita health contribution by government to the public 
sector. It is likely that current tax subsidies will be replaced, at 
least partially, by a fixed per capita contribution from 
government to the SHI fund. 
Not only do the individual components of the financing of 
an SHI fund necessitate wisdom and expertise, but careful co-
ordination of these initiatives, including their implementation, 
is of paramount importance. The challenge for government is 
to ensure significant growth of medical scheme membership. 
This can only be achieved if the mandatory contribution by 
individuals is accepted as affordable. 
Critical success factors for the delivery 
of affordable quality health care 
For fully fledged SHI to succeed in South Africa, the focus 
must be on creating efficiencies in the delivery of 'privately' 
funded health care. This necessitates: (i) the establishment of 
alternative reimbursement models for delivery of health care 
services; and (ii) prioritisation of resource allocation based on 
sound scientific, economic and ethical principles 
Simplistically, without creating the necessary efficiencies and 
priorities, medical scheme contributions will become 
increasingly unaffordable, with the result that fewer rather 
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than more individuals will elect to pre-fund an appropriate 
level of health care coverage. This is of particular relevance 
where employers are moving towards cost-to-company 
reimbursement packages, or capped medical scheme 
contributions, which shifts the entire burden of spiralling 
healths':lre costs onto the employee. Percentage-based medical 
scheme subsidies for employees are not sustainable in an 
environment where inflation on medical scheme contributions 
continues to exceed the CPl. Furthermore, broad mandatory 
cover, a key component of the proposed SHI system, is likely to 
be opposed by trade union movements unless contributions are 
accepted as affordable and the quality of care as reasonable. 
The focus must therefore be on affordability and quality, with 
quality determined by both ease of access and level of care. 
Establishment of alternative reimbursement models 
for delivery of health care services 
The commercial relationships that to a large degree still 
dominate the delivery of privately funded health care are 
flawed. In a fee-for-service environment there is insufficient 
incentive for service providers to focus on the delivery of cost-
effective practices and to minimise waste. Furthermore, 
relationships based on doubtful incentives (e.g. rebates and 
kickbacks) have been inflationary- by encouraging 
overservicing, by artificially increasing prices and by 
promoting expensive care that has marginal benefit. In an 
environment of oversupply, where rationing through a 
queueing system does not apply (as it does in the public 
system), providers are inadequately incentivised to manage 
limited resources. In order for providers to acknowledge the 
limitations of resources, some type of accountability for budget 
management is called for. This thinking underpins the 
burgeoning trend of alternative reimbursement models, such as 
global fees and capitation, which aim to share financial risk 
between funders and providers and thus align the groups' 
financial incentives. Such strategic partnerships, which 
incentivise not only sharing of financial risk but also increased 
autonomy and accountability of doctors in allocation of scarce 
health care resources, will be critical for successful 
implementation of a new model. As these models succeed, 
non-health-care costs relating to administration and managed 
care should decrease. 
Furthermore, it is contended that as a result of monopolistic 
behaviour private sector health care delivery is not sufficiently 
competitive. This is seen as an opportunity for the State to 
promote use of public-sector facilities. If public-sector facilities 
can succeed in drawing medical scheme funds, such monies 
could be used to cross-subsidise quality of health care to the 
indigent population of our country. Of course the key is for 
public institutions to be truly competitive, both in the tariffs 
charged for predefined services and in the services offered 
including the technical expertise of their professional staff.' 
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The future is therefore dependent on risk-sharing agreements 
that include not only schemes and private-sector providers, but 
also the state. 
Prioritisation of resource allocation 
Prioritisation of )lealth care resources is a core component 
determining the affordability and quality of health care 
delivery. For allocation to be just, purchasing limitations of 
community funds have to be acknowledged. Furthermore, 
allocation of funds must be based on sound scientific, 
economic and ethical criteria, with the latter encompassing 
both procedural and substantive aspects of decision making. 
Such an approach is necessary at all levels of policy definition. 
In the private sector, these levels include: (i) government (the 
macro level); (ii) schemes and their contracted managed care 
companies (the meso level); and (iii) the doctor-patient 
relationship at the point of service (the micro level). 
The macro level 
Laws and policies of the country influence access to health 
insurance plans and benefit designs. Before 2000, when the 
medical schemes industry was deregulated, government did 
not influence the use of private health care funds. However, 
with the introduction of legislation to facilitate the roll-out of. 
SHI, government is dictating a minimum level of care that has 
to be funded by all (the PMBs). The original objectives of such 
a package included: (i) prevention of dumping on the public 
health system; (ii) protection of cover for necessary and high-
cost items; and (iii) the promotion of more appropriate 
behaviour in benefit design, costing and management of costs. 
The focus was on ensuring access to hospital-based benefits 
at a minimum level of care commensurate with that available 
in public-sector facilities for specific diseases. Such an 
approach was protective of public-sector resources, and 
consumers. However, with the recent inclusion of chronic 
medicine and other primary care benefits for limited, but 
generally common indications, it appears that the focus in the 
definition of PMBs has shifted towards creating a stand-alone 
(or SHI) package. Mindful of this, it may have been fairer if 
government had elected to opt for an inclusive set of basic 
benefits, instead of an exclusive set of comprehensive benefits. 
That is, instead of limiting ambulatory cover strictly to 25 
diseases (at a level of care that sometimes exceeds standard 
practice within tertiary public-sector facilities), more inclusive 
disease coverage at a more basic level of care may be more 
compatible with the local concept of an SHI package. In 
particular, rarer diseases that can be regarded as 'similar' to lfiJ 
PMB-listed chronic diseases (e.g. ankylosing spondylitis versus 
rheumatoid arthritis) should have been considered for 
inclusion. It is unlikely that they pose any significant actuarial 
risk, there is no sound reason for excluding them compared 
with similar diseases that have been assigned PMB status, and 
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'adaptation' of disease codes is likely to result in their payment 
anyway. The focus should be on giving the majority of patients 
with chronic illnesses - which are amenable to good results at 
affordable cost - a fair chance to reasonable health care access. 
It is therefore critical that the primary objectives of the basic 
package are crystallised and that legislators do not lose sight of 
these. 
The temptation to benchmark the basic level of care against 
that of First-World socialised health systems, e.g. those of 
Australia and the UK, must also be resisted. Not only do 
these countries have greater resources for expenditure on 
health care than South Africa' and different infrastructures for 
the delivery of health care, but their needs differ based on 
disease patterns. Whereas in First-World countries the 
prevention and treatment of westernised diseases is often 
prioritised, South Africa has to distribute its funds fairly to 
address its triple burden of disease, viz. infectious diseases, 
including the HIV pandemic, trauma and lifestyle-related 
illnesses. Furthermore, the inclusion of interventions with 
marginal benefit, those expensive even in First-World terms, 
and those that could be regarded as enhancement technologies 
have no place within an essential South African package. 
Failure to apply the stated objectives consistently and 
transparently in the definition of PMBs will result in an 
inappropriate basic health package. Government cannot afford 
enigmas if policymakers are to resist pressures by vociferous 
and powerful stakeholders. 
The meso level 
The level of health care that may be funded for individual 
members of private schemes is determined by the elected 
governing body of medical schemes (the Board of Trustees), 
and the contracted managed-care companies. Before 2000, 
many trustees relied almost exclusively on actuarial and 
marketing strategies to ensure scheme viability and open-
market competitiveness. Unlimited oncology benefits coupled 
with unrealistic shrinking of chronic medicine benefits are 
examples of such irrational, unsustainable forms of budget 
allocation. However, the introduction of PMB legislation and 
the proposed risk"equalisation fund is forcing a population-
based approach to benefit prioritisation and structuring. If 
schemes are to remain viable they have to rely increasingly on 
clinical risk-management programmes to control expenditure. 
Typically, managed-care organisations are appointed to manage 
such risk. Although benefit utilisation management companies 
contracted on a fee-for-service basis have added value, an 
integrated as opposed to top-down management approach is 
the way of the future. This implies both alignment of financial 
incentives between funders and providers, and collaboration 
on clinical policy issues. In such an evolving environment 
patients may well feel vulnerable. It is therefore crucial that 
managed-care organisations have a robust infrastructure for the 
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development of clinical standards - not only to ensure that 
resources are prioritised optimally based on sound scientific, 
economic and ethical reasoning, but also to ensure that 
standards of. care are explicit. This allows for both external 
scrutiny and for benchmarks against which member 
complaints can be judged. To ensure fairness, members must 
be provided with readily accessible processes that in the event 
of dispute allow them a fair and objective hearing. This is 
particularly important where tough and uncomfortable 
decisions of no funding have been made. In the private sector, 
clinically based rationing is largely focused on promoting the 
most efficient treatment where alternative therapies exist, e.g. 
by means of formularies, reference pricing, and step-wise 
treatment approaches. However, in a socialised system there 
will increasingly be interventions that are simply excluded, 
especially those that have marginal benefit and are very 
expensive. Nevertheless, as long as policy decisions are based 
on sound reasoning and collated in an open manner as 
mandated by medical scheme regulations, we believe that the 
new funding platform lends itself to fairer resource allocation 
than in the past. Obviously such a statement is made with the 
expectation that trustees do not actively discriminate in a 
different manner, namely on a disease-specific basis. There 
have been reports of schemes excluding payment of certain 
non-legislated chronic diseases altogether from their overall 
risk pools, where treatment is cost-effective and readily 
available from the state. Such decisions should be actively 
opposed. 
The micro level 
The doctor-patient relationship is a key determinant of 
resource allocation. In the past, distribution of funds in the 
private health care sector was determined almost exclusively 
by these parties. However, as inflation of private-sector health 
care continued to spiral, medical schemes and government 
have taken a prominent role in determining the prioritisation 
of expenditure. Such involvement has been resented by many 
practitioners as they perceive their professional autonomy and 
judgement to be challenged. This response has been further 
fuelled by the accompanying administrative burden relating to 
complex benefit designs and reimbursement rules, and the 
perception that member benefits continue to decrease despite 
increasing scheme contributions and meddling by bureaucrats. 
Neither doctors nor patients have been informed adequately 
that the determinants of affordability of health care delivery 
have shifted. Historically, affordability was determined by 
individual benefit limits alone. However, within the PMB 
('unlimited') environment, resource allocation (payment rules), 
especially with regard to funding of the essential health care 
package, is determined increasingly by group considerations. 
Although the resilience, patience and integrity of most 
providers in this changing and stressful environment are 
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highly commended, we believe there are factors impeding the 
transition towards rational and more sustainable use of health 
care resources, namely: (i) unrealistic expectations of health 
care interventions, which are fuelled by those with commercial 
interests in their use; (ii) benchmarking clinical practices in the 
private sector against those of the USA and other well-
resourced countries; (iii) insufficient acceptance and guidance 
by independent local specialist groups of what constitutes a 
fair level of clinical care in a resource-constrained environment; 
and (iv) subscription to the ethos that provision of the 'best' 
health care services - whatever the cost to society or other 
scheme members - must take precedence over all other ethical 
considerations and obligations 
We are in no way suggesting that doctors abandon 'best 
practice principles'. Instead we would like to propose critical 
appraisal of what constitutes best practice in our resource-
restrained context and how such practice is applied. 7 Because 
of strong marketing forces, incomplete information and time 
constraints, doctors are often disadvantaged when evaluating 
new advances in health care. The fact that best care is often 
'established and cheap' care, conservative care or aggressive 
lifestyle intervention is easily ignored. Further, there needs to 
be acceptance that not all 'best care' can be prioritised within a 
societal benefits package. 
For government to succeed in its endeavours to improve 
access to quality care, doctors (particularly those servicing 
members of medical schemes) need to embrace the concept of 
resource allocation based on socialistic principles. This includes 
defining sound clinical policies relevant to the South African 
situation.'·' 
Conclusion 
By introducing the concept of social governance of medical 
schemes, legislation has enabled an environment of fairer 
budget allocation within the private sector. Furthermore, it is 
protecting drainage of public-sector resources by medical 
scheme members. However, for the full intentions of social 
health reform to be realised, especially as further legislation 
facilitating SHI is promulgated, the health care market must 
respond responsibly. First and foremost there must be 
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widespread acceptance of population-based prioritisation of 
health care resources. Secondly, such prioritisation must be 
based on sound scientific, economic and ethical thinking. It is 
critically important for all role-players, especially practising 
providers of care, to participate in the debate and influence 
decision-making meaningfully. In an environment where trust 
is established between funders and providers, reimbursement 
policies could indeed support individual doctors in the day-to-
day management of patients, especially where patients have 
unrealistic demands and expectations. At all levels, resource 
allocation as a result of political and commercial pressures 
must be minimised. The sentiment that the end-point can only 
be mediocre medicine must be abolished. A re-focus on 
excellent clinical skills and judgement by practitioners (instead 
of the injudicious use of modern technologically based 
diagnostics and interventions10 ) and the promotion of centres 
of excellence that will provide the latter, where indicated, can 
continue to ensure access to first-class medical care. Although 
there are many hurdles to be overcome and many challenges to 
be faced, we believe that the appropriate ethos for success has 
been introduced by the new legislative platform governing 
private medical schemes. Failure to understand or accept 
these changes, and failure to act within the spirit of the 
legislation, could, however, result in increasing government 
intervention that may ultimately prove to be destructive. 
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